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Comptroller General Walker, I would like to thank you and your staff, not only for the hard work that you have dedicated to this assessment, but for the over one hundred other reports you have worked on concerning our efforts in Iraq.
The developments and issues covered by the GAO report, and to be addressed by General Petreaus and Ambassador Crocker next week, are personally important to me, as my stepson, Douglas, and daughter-in-law, Lindsay, having served as Marine fighter pilots in Iraq, contributed to safeguarding U.S. interests in that country and to the emergence of a free, democratic Iraqi nation.
They are but two, among so many brave men and women, committed to the successful accomplishment of our mission in Iraq.
Given the gravity of this subject, it should come as no surprise that significant challenges do remain, and that all of the benchmarks were not fully achieved within the 3 ½ month timeframe since the Supplemental was enacted.
Rather than using my time to give broad, rhetorical statements on Iraq policy, I will raise a few specific questions and issues to the Comptroller General to address during his presentation.
First, clarification on the methodology used to interpret the benchmarks would be greatly appreciated.
Throughout the report, there are footnotes noting how the GAO defined a particular benchmark or particular subset within the broader benchmark.
What were the general parameters guiding GAO in arriving at such individual definitions?
Related to that, I am interested to learn your reasons for classifying certain benchmarks as not having been met, while indicating that progress has, in fact, been achieved on some of the issues under consideration within a particular benchmark.
Should this not qualify under your assessment as “partially met?”
For example, in the benchmark regarding the formation of “a constitutional review committee and completing the constitutional review,” your report indicates that the Iraqi legislature formed a Constitutional Review Committee in November 2006.
Would this not constitute the partial achievement of this benchmark?
Furthermore, would you agree that the fact that the Constitutional Review Committee has received an extension, and will most likely petition the Council of Representatives for another, indicate that the CRC is making forward progress in addressing these issues?
Similarly, what criteria did you utilize to come to the conclusion that:
“The Iraqi government has failed to comply with the benchmark calling for “enacting and implementing legislation establishing an Independent High Electoral Commission, provincial elections law, provincial council authorities, and a date for provincial elections.”
I understanding that, as stated in your report, the benchmark requires more than the establishment of the Commission, such as the enactment of supporting laws, under what circumstances would it be considered partially achieved?
I would also appreciate it if you would elaborate upon your findings regarding the benchmarks requiring enacting and implementing both the hydrocarbons and de-Ba’athification legislation?
By the GAO report’s own description, the Iraqi government has drafted the pieces of legislation aimed at ensuring an equitable distribution of Iraqi oil resources.
The report goes on to elaborate upon the legislative process that these bills are subject to, highlighting the review by the Shura Council of one bill, and noting, with respect to oil sharing, that the Iraqi constitution does not reserve this oil sharing right exclusively for the central government.
As such, the regions have a degree of discretionary authority.
Thus, while we understand why the final assessment on benchmark 3 and other legislative benchmarks is listed as “not met”, would you not agree that there is forward progress being made on these issues?
Based on GAO’s evaluation, would you be able to extrapolate a potential timeframe for when some of these bills may be enacted?
Of course, as legislators ourselves, we know how unpredictable the legislative process can be and how many different dynamics can alter the estimated timeline for adoption and enactment.
Mr. Comptroller General, I would also greatly appreciate further clarification on your criteria for assessing other benchmarks.
For example, the report states that the benchmark requiring that the Government of Iraq provide “Iraqi commanders with all authorities to execute” the Baghdad Security Plan, “without political intervention” has not been met, citing that “political intervention in the conduct of some security operations continues.”
At what level is this interference taking place?
Is it the official policy of the Government of Iraq—explicit or implied?
Similarly, regarding the benchmark concerning enforcement of the law by the Iraqi Security Forces, is this the stated policy of the Government of Iraq, or as mandated by Prime Minister Maliki?
Finally, with respect to the benchmark aimed at “ensuring that Iraq’s political authorities are not undermining or making false accusations against members of the Iraqi Security Forces,” which particular authorities were involved in making these accusations?
Is it isolated to the periphery of the political spectrum, or is it the conduct of the central government?
Pertinent to these issues, I have constituents serving in Iraq, as many of us do, who have a more positive assessment of the situation on the ground based on their direct, first-hand experiences.
One just sent me an email last week which highlights the immense risks taken by Iraqi leaders at all levels and the extreme pressure they are subjected to.
My constituent said, in the area where he is stationed located near Baghdad:
“The key Al Qaeda leaders have fled the area…”
“Families have running water almost all day now and maybe 16 hours of electricity each day. More and more people are opening their shops on the market street, as they feel comfortable enough to sell their goods to their neighbors…”
“Iraqi Army leaders are taking a genuine interest in securing the area and helping locals with their day to day problems...”
He continues:
“However, Al Qaeda has been attempting to thwart our efforts to gain control and better the community. They have murdered 5 members of one family because one of the younger sons desired to become an Iraqi Policeman. There has been one [town mayor] murdered who had taken much initiative to form a "Neighborhood Watch" group to inform us and the Iraqi Army of suspicious activity and enemy intelligence.”
This first-hand account raises questions for me about some of the conclusions in the report we are evaluating today.
It also highlights the need to contextualize the assessments to provide clarity about whether the problems that remain are due to a lack of will rather than lack of capacity.
Are they caused by Iraqi inaction or, rather, by the actions of insurgents, Islamist jihadists, and rogue regimes neighboring Iraq, who are doing everything possible to establish their control over Iraq and the region.
In the report, the GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense provide certain information to the President “with appropriate caveats.”
Perhaps, GAO should consider similar steps in formulating future assessments.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to again thank Comptroller General Walker for appearing before the Committee today, and for his insight as to where our energies may be best focused to help the Government of Iraq, and the people of Iraq in meeting these benchmarks, while advancing U.S. strategic security interests.
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