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Mr. Chairman, Members, as all of us know, the Administration will soon release the Iraqi Benchmark Assessment Report, enumerating the Iraqi government's progress on the security and political fronts, and this Monday, Ambassador Crocker and General Petreaus will be appearing before our committees to discuss their findings.
We should, therefore, ask ourselves why we would be holding a hearing with a private panel to discuss the findings of a report that has yet to be provided to the Congress, and why we should be speculating on policy beyond the September report without, again, having received the report or the testimony by General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker.
The title of this hearing is, “Beyond the September Report: What’s Next for Iraq?”
I prefer to focus my remarks on the assessments and information that we already have.
The National Intelligence Estimate released last month reports “measurable but uneven improvements in Iraq’s security situation,” and says that a shift from counterinsurgency operations to efforts simply to train Iraqis “would erode security gains achieved so far.”
On the other hand, the estimate is grim on the prospects of the Maliki government remaining in power.
It assesses that the situation for the Maliki government “will become more precarious over the next six to 12 months.”
The surge has thus been unable to facilitate legislative progress on the part of the central government to meet the benchmarks enumerated by the Congress, but important political progress has been taking place in Iraq.
The turn of so many Sunni tribes and organizations away from al Qaeda and in support of the Iraqi government and Coalition Forces is a crucial political development, and not one that we should discount because it happened in a manner and on a timetable that no one in this body had predicted.
It is also critically important to consider the developments in context; to look beyond just the NIE and the assessments by the GAO, whom the Foreign Affairs Committee heard from yesterday; and consider next steps only after we have reviewed all of the pertinent reports and presentations.
It is also necessary to listen to our troops, who can provide us with first-hand accounts on the progress being achieved.
One constituent of mine currently serving in Iraq wrote to me recently to provide his assessment of the situation on the ground in the area where he is located.
He underscored:
“We have accomplished a lot…in the past two months.”
“…Before we arrived, these neighborhoods had not received rice, flour, sugar and tea from the government for the past 10 months because al-Qaeda had strongpointed the area and claimed [the city] as the Islamic State of Iraq, sentencing people to death in their Islamic Courts on a regular basis.”
Now he continues, “more and more people are opening their shops on the market street, as they feel comfortable enough to sell their goods to their neighbors.”
“Iraqi Army leaders are taking a genuine interest in securing the area and helping locals with their day to day problems...”
He continues:
“However, Al Qaeda has been attempting to thwart our efforts to gain control and better the community…”
This last statement was particularly striking to me, as I recalled what was stated in the recent NIE on Iraq.
The NIE said:
• “Perceptions that the Coalition is withdrawing probably will encourage factions anticipating a power vacuum to seek local security solutions that could intensify sectarian violence and intra-sectarian competition.”
I would be interested to hear from our witnesses their views regarding these findings
We must, therefore, proceed with extreme caution and ensure that timetables for the implementation of certain political and economic requirements, does not become the determining factor for U.S. military decisions.
Further, using these benchmarks as a measure of progress toward national reconciliation, also ignores other significant factors that both impact the Iraqi political landscape as well as our own U.S. security interests.
I am specifically referring to the threats posed by the regimes in Tehran and Damascus.
In this respect, I would appreciate it if our witnesses would comment on the findings of the NIE states that:
• “Over the next year Tehran, concerned about a Sunni reemergence in Iraq and US efforts to limit Iranian influence, will continue to provide funding, weaponry, and training to Iraqi Shia militants;” and
• “the IC now assesses that Damascus is providing support to non-AQI groups inside Iraq in a bid to increase Syrian influence.”
We must also be careful not to confuse long-term and short-term political progress
In the long-term, a national unity government fairly representing all segments of Iraqi society will clearly help ensure stability.
However, in the short-term, the assumption that a national unity government is required to pacify the Sunni insurgency, or to challenge Shia militias has turned out to be false.
The Sunnis have turned against al Qaeda and are gradually switching sides in the absence of any oil, federalism, or de-Baathification deal coming out of Baghdad.
The NIE notes:
• “Coalition military operations focused on improving population security, both in and outside of Baghdad, will remain critical to the success of local and regional efforts until sectarian fears are diminished enough to enable the Shia-led Iraqi Government to fully support the efforts of local Sunni groups.”
Concurrently, there is evidence of an increasingly moderate Shia bloc within the central government emerging out of the conflict raging in the south of Iraq.
Significant challenges remain and no one should have anticipated that all of Iraq's problems would be solved by September 15th.
The questions we must ask, therefore I would appreciate it if our witnesses would elaborate on these, are:
• Has the new strategy succeeded in accomplishing the goals it set out to achieve up to this point?
• And are the trends positive or negative?
I thank the distinguished witnesses for appearing before us today and I look forward to receiving their testimony.
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