Mr. Chairman, this past week, this Committee received testimony on the current situation in Iraq and U.S. strategy in that country from General David Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan Crocker.

Prior to their testimony, the Congress received the Jones Report, stating that the Iraqi Security Forces are carrying part of that burden, and that their ability to do so will increase in the coming months.

Other findings of the Jones report include:

•  “While severely deficient in combat support and combat service support capabilities, the new Iraqi armed forces, especially the Army, show clear evidence of developing the baseline infrastructures that lead to the successful formation of a national defense capability…”

Continuing to quote from the Jones report:

• “The Iraqi police are improving at the local level predominantly where the ethnic makeup of the population is relatively homogenous and the police are recruited from the local area…Police forces are hampered by corruption and dysfunction within the Ministry of Interior.

Likewise, an examination of the September 15th Benchmark Assessment Report requires careful analysis of the different ways in which groups of citizens, local and provincial governments, have been able to address the requirements of the benchmark legislation.

This most recent report was based on data available as of September 1st and reflects that the Iraqis have taken actions on nine benchmarks.

The September 15th report also assessed seven benchmarks as not satisfactory, including

• enactment and implementation of legislation to ensure the equitable distribution of hydrocarbon revenue;
• increasing the number of Iraqi Security Force units capable of operating independently;
• ensuring that Iraq’s political authorities are not undermining or making false accusations against members of the Iraq Security Forces;
• eliminating militia control of local security;
• eliminating sectarian bias within the Iraqi Police;
• eliminating political intervention by leaders throughout the chain of command; and
• establishing provincial council authorities and establishing a date for provincial elections.

Four of these were assessed as showing forward momentum.

Two others, including implementing a general amnesty and a militia disarmament program were unable to be assessed as the necessary preconditions have not been achieved.

Now that we have received reports and testimony from a variety of sources, and will be adding the expertise of our distinguished witnesses today, we must refocus on how we can best accomplish our short and long-term strategic objectives in Iraq.

Primary among these is to prevent al Qaeda from establishing a base in Iraq and preventing Iran from “filling the vacuum”—something that the Iranian regime has publicly stated it is ready and willing to do. 

As the August National Intelligence Estimate stated:

“Assistance to armed groups, especially from Iran, exacerbates the violence inside Iraq…over the next year Tehran…will continue to provide funding, weaponry, and training to Iraqi Shia militants. Iran has been intensifying aspects of its lethal support for select groups of Iraqi Shia militants, particularly the JAM, since at least the beginning of 2006.”

The NIE also states that “the IC now assesses that Damascus is providing support to non-AQI groups inside Iraq in a bid to increase Syrian influence.”

General Petraeus stated in his testimony that: “Syria has allowed its soil to be transited by foreign fighters who have come from a variety of source countries in the Gulf area and the North African countries…” and “Iran, has carried out very, very harmful activities inside Iraq. Funding, training, arming and, in some cases, even directing the activities of the special groups…”

These pariah states view Iraq as a central front in their broader efforts.

We must work together to counter the nefarious objectives of these rogue regimes in their realignment against the United States and our allies.

As illustrated by Israel’s recent air strike in Syria, reportedly aimed at a nuclear-related facility that North Korea was helping to equip, the state-sponsors of terrorism are helping each other enhance their capabilities. 

This is why it is so disconcerting to see reports today that Syria, a country of proliferation concern for quite some time, has been elected Deputy Chairman of the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Mr. Chairman, in light of these and other developments pertaining to Syria and ongoing United Nations failures, I respectfully ask that you bring to mark-up two bills I have introduced this session: 

• One, which I introduced with my good friend and distinguished colleague, Mr. Engel, the Syria Accountability and Liberation Act (H.R. 2332) and
• the other, the United Nations Transparency, Accountability, and Reform Act (H.R. 2712), which includes several provisions on the IAEA aimed at preventing situations such as the one I just mentioned concerning Syria. 

What these events clearly illustrate is, again, the need to join forces to counter the enemy’s united front.

Deterrence remains a critical component of combating the efforts of these rogue regimes, as well as the Islamist militants they support.

Mr. Chairman, for those who would argue that Iraq is not in our national security interests, I would offer the comparison with Bosnia.  

In testimony before the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs, on March 4, 1998, former Secretary of State Madeline Albright legitimized our continuing intervention in Bosnia by stating:

“if we turn our backs on Bosnia now, as some urge, the confidence we are building would erode. The result could well be a return to genocide and war…Quitting is not the American way. In Bosnia, the mission should determine the timetable, not the other way around …we should continue to play an appropriate role in Bosnia as long as our help is needed…that is the right thing to do…and it is the smart thing, for it is the only way to ensure that when our troops do leave Bosnia, they leave for good.”

Compared to Iraq, Mr. Chairman, Bosnia was not a pillar of U.S. security strategy, nor did it contain strategic resources, bases or regimes with nuclear ambitions capable of threatening the U.S. homeland, our interests, and our closest ally in the region, Israel. 

We look forward to receiving our witness’ recommendations as to how we can achieve success in Iraq and the implications for our broader regional efforts.