Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

In the 1990s, a newly independent Russia, attempted to quickly leap into the community of democratic states and integrate itself into the global economy.

While significant efforts were made to bring Russia out of its communist framework, we realize now how unsuccessful these were in several key areas.

Corruption embedded itself at the highest levels of the Russian government.

An economic collapse in the late 1990s was reversed only by a subsequent rise in prices for Russia’s main exports: oil and gas.

Elections became ever more obviously rigged through state manipulation of the media, alleged falsification of vote tallies and intimidation of political opponents.

The Russian people’s nationalism was harnessed for the election of those affiliated with the Kremlin in late 1999, and for the election of Vladimir Putin in March 2000—this, through a mysterious series of bombings of Russian apartment buildings and the invasion of Chechnya.

We have since seen Putin take Russia down a path of authoritarian and anti-democratic domestic politics and aggressive and irresponsible foreign policy.

While Russia’s privatization of the 1990s had directed that wealth to an influential group of so-called “oligarchs” outside of the government, under Putin, a sort of re-privatization, has directed much of that wealth into the hands of those at the very top of the Russian government, if not, in fact, into Mr. Putin’s hands directly.

Nascent independent parties allowed to function in the 1990s have been squeezed out of political participation, in favor of pseudo-parties set up by, and for the benefit of, the circle around Mr. Putin in the Kremlin.

Regardless of the euphemisms the Putin government uses, we now understand that Russia today is nothing more than a “virtual democracy,” as some have called it, with a core of state-directed corruption and state-manipulated nationalism.

Although it is still a guessing game as to who will be Russia’s president after Putin’s term runs out in March, what seems clear is that neither that transition nor the upcoming Parliamentary elections in December will be free or democratic.

The Kremlin has cracked down on political opposition groups through administrative measures and harassment and brought the media almost completely under state control or influence. 

Over the past decade, by some estimates, close to 90 independent Russian
reporters have been murdered or have died under mysterious circumstances, with almost all of those victims having been involved in investigations of corruption.

I also want to take this opportunity to again bring up the poisoning of Alexander Litvinenko late last year in England.

He was a former member of the Russian security services and had made serious accusations about corruption at the top levels of the Russian government and about government involvement in the 1999 apartment bombings.

To date, the Russian government has refused British requests to extradite a prime suspect in that poisoning.

In an attempt to keep our attention focused on that matter, I have introduced House Concurrent Resolution 154, which asks the President and the Secretary of State to urge Mr. Putin to cooperate fully with the British Government in its investigation.

Turning to Russia’s foreign policy, any attentive observer of Russian affairs can see the determination with which Moscow is seeking to use the monopoly of energy supplies to Western Europe, as a tool of manipulation and, to some extent, coercion.

On the issue of the future status of the region of Kosovo, Russia’s refusal to remove its troops from Moldova and its sustained support for separatist regions in Georgia are not justified and extremely unhelpful.

Its attempts to prevent the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe from continuing to act as a meaningful agent of human rights and democracy are transparent.

With respect to efforts to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear weapon state and to end the genocide in Darfur, Russia has been more part of the problem than any significant part of the solution.

Finally, its continued sale of advanced weapons to Iran and Syria also remains a grave concern to many of us.
 
To try to continue to address this last issue --- arms transfers to Iran and Syria --- I am, this week, introducing a resolution that calls on Russia to immediately end those arms sales and urges the President to fully utilize his existing authorities to implement sanctions against those Russian entities found to be undertaking arms transfers to those regimes.

Mr. Chairman, I again thank our distinguished witnesses for being here today and look forward to hearing their views on these and other important issues.