North Korea’s increasingly reckless behavior represents an immediate and growing threat not only on the Korean peninsula but to the entire Asia/Pacific region.

This region has enjoyed an unprecedented period of peace and prosperity for several decades, and has been transformed into an engine of the global economy.

However, North Korea’s repeated provocations, including last year’s July 4th missile launches and the October nuclear test, pose a great threat to the stability required for the region’s continued growth.

The impact of a major crisis would be felt far beyond Korea, not only in Tokyo and Hong Kong but in London and New York as well.

Concerns have been raised that Kim Jong-il and his regime may conduct a second nuclear test in the near future. 

This, in turn, could trigger a nuclear arms race in the region, with Japan, South Korea, and perhaps even Taiwan re-evaluating their fundamental security needs.

The threat posed by North Korea’s nuclear program has wider, even global, implications. 
The regime has long been a major proliferator of nuclear and other WMD materials and technology.

Its ties to the A.Q. Khan nuclear blackmarket network have been extensively documented.

In addition, Pyongyang has been involved for many years in missile sales to Iran and other rogue states in the Middle East.

The damage caused to the northern cities of Israel last summer from North Korean missiles supplied by Iran to Hezbollah is a stark example of the threat posed by the regime’s continuing proliferation.

We are seeking answers today on how to counter North Korea’s increasingly provocative behavior.

What steps can the U.S. take working with specific allies, through the Six-Party Talks, and at the UN Security Council to put the North Korean nuclear genie back in the bottle?

A regional proliferation problem needs a regional solution, as this is a concern which extends beyond the outstanding bilateral issues which separate Washington and Pyongyang. 

That will require a greater commitment and concrete action from the other countries in the region, especially China.

Greater attention must also be focused on the various means by which North Korea has accessed the hard currency needed to finance its proliferation activities.

Following the clampdown on the Macau-based Banco Delta Asia in 2005, Kim’s regime was forced to resort to ever-more desperate and illicit activities to keep the cash flowing.

These activities include ongoing schemes such as fraudulent insurance claims and other financial scams involving the United Nations Development Program and other UN agencies.

We must work to deny these resources to the regime in North Korea.

I expect this Committee to devote continued attention to this problem in the months ahead.

Regarding the subject of the UN and North Korea, it should be noted that the UN’s most recent special envoy for North Korea was Canadian businessman and disgraced former UN official, Maurice Strong.

I remind my colleagues that Mr. Strong received a million dollars from Saddam Hussein, via Tongsun Park, who was convicted last year in a United States federal court.

Mr. Strong also received a number of gifts from Mr. Park, including subsidized rent of Strong’s New York office.

I will be very interested to see who the new Secretary-General selects to be Maurice Strong’s replacement as special envoy. 

Given that Mr. Strong retains friends in high places at the UN, he may seek to play a role in selecting his own replacement.

The UN has the potential to play a positive role in 2007 with respect to North Korea.  But it may choose to continue to play a very negative role by serving as a conduit for cash for the North Korean regime.

Kim Jong-il’s past eagerness to engage in illicit activities, including drug trafficking in Japan and counterfeiting of U.S. currency, indicates that the Dear Leader would have no hesitation in striking a deal of proliferation for profit.

This is an issue of the utmost urgency, and I welcome the comments of our distinguished panel of experts.